Duration and durability of the Italian Governments: an Old Paradox Revisited

Abstract

The Italian paradox of ‘stable instability’ characterized the First Republic, with a very short duration of governments but with a stable political class. During the last twenty years we notice a “partially” growing of governmental duration, but what about the stability of the political class along with the crisis of party government? This question calls for empirical investigation in search of a more precise understanding. First, this article will focus on the concepts of duration and durability of the Italian executives and its ministers, as a premise of further comparative analysis. Second, it will investigate the Italian ministerial elite to catch the decreasing role of political parties in stabilizing the political class. Finally, we will concentrate attention on the instability of the Italian party system as one of the main explanations of (the lack of) governmental durability. This leads to the conclusion that, leaving apart the rhetoric of stronger Italian executives, Italy has been living a period of greater instability.